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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal, Melonie Dawn Smith asserts: (1) the district court erred when it denied her
motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of her house; (2) the district court abused its
discretion by allowing hearsay testimony of two witnesses to be admitted for the truth of the
matter asserted; and (3) there was fundamental error in using a video showing her repeatedly
refusing to consent to a search of her house was admitted at trial, and in the prosecutor arguing
the jurors should infer her guilt based on those refusals.

Because these errors, either

independently or cumulatively, deprived Ms. Smith of her right to a fair trial, this Court should
vacate her judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues Ms. Smith has not shown: (1) that the district
court erred when it denied her motion to suppress; (2) that the district court abused its discretion
when it overruled her hearsay objections to the testimony of the two witnesses; (3) that the
admission of the video rose to the level of fundamental error; (4) that the prosecutor's comment
in closing argument rose to the level of fundamental error; and (5) that the cumulative error
doctrine applies to her case. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-39.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's vanous arguments, which are
unavailing, internally inconsistent, and contrary to United States Supreme Court and Idaho
Supreme Court precedent.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Smith's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Smith's motion to suppress because
the exigent circumstances and protective sweep exceptions do not justify the warrantless
search of her house after officers froze the scene, and the inevitable discovery doctrine
does not prevent the suppression of the evidence gained from that unlawful search.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the Leslies' hearsay
testimony to be admitted for the truth of the matters asserted.

III.

Whether several of Ms. Smith's constitutional rights were violated, amounting to
fundamental error, when a video showing her repeatedly refusing to consent to a search
of her house was admitted at trial and the prosecutor argued the jurors should infer her
guilt based on those refusals.

IV.

Whether, even if the above preserved errors are individually harmless, Ms. Smith's
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the
accumulation of errors deprived her of her right to a fair trial.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Smith's Motion To Suppress Because The Exigent
Circumstances And Protective Sweep Exceptions Do Not Justify The Warrantless Search Of Her
House After Officers Froze The Scene, And The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not
Prevent The Suppression Of The Evidence Gained From That Unlawful Search
A.

The District Court's Determination That The Exigent Circumstances Exception Justified
The W arrantless Intrusion Was Erroneous Because, Once The Officers Detained
Ms. Smith, Any Reasonable Fear Oflmminent Destruction Of Evidence Was Gone
Once the officers detained Ms. Smith outside her house, any reasonable fear that she

could immediately destroy evidence was gone. Cf Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328-29
(2001 ). The fact that Ms. Duke was still inside the house, without more, was not sufficient to
create a reasonable fear of imminent destruction of evidence. See Stackhouse v. State, 468 A.2d
333, 342 (Md. Ct. App. 1983).

Even if Ms. Duke had presented an imminent threat of

destruction of evidence, the officers' search of the house went far beyond what that exigency
would have justified. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393
(1978).

Thus, the exigent circumstances exception does not justify the officers' warrantless

intrusion into Ms. Smith's house on the basis ofremoval or destruction of evidence.
The State argues "the exigency did not end until the officers confirmed that no one else
was in the home trying to destroy the evidence." (Resp. Br., p.10.) However, State v. Fees, 140
Idaho 81 (2004 ), upon which the State relies for that argument, is distinguishable from the
present case. (See Resp. Br., p.10.) In Fees, officers entered the defendant's house to secure it
after arresting the defendant on suspicion of a drug trafficking offenses because the officers
feared the defendant's wife may have learned of the arrest and might attempt to destroy
evidence. See Fees, 140 Idaho at 83. The critical part of the Court's analysis on that point was
that the officers in Fees had actually observed the defendant's wife carrying boxes and the
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defendant's briefcase into the house with the defendant, and later, saw a woman with an empty
baby stroller talk with the wife and enter the house. See id. Here, the officers had not directly
observed Ms. Duke or anyone else act with a similar level of potential involvement in the alleged
criminal activity. (See R., pp.276-81.) Further, Mr. Lopez did not report to the officers that
Ms. Duke had participated in the cleanup at the house. (See R., pp.268-73.)
The State also makes several hypothetical arguments to try to justify the entry, such as, if
Ms. Smith had "started a fire in the stove immediately prior to answering the door, the evidence
could have been destroyed without any further action from [Ms.] Smith." (See Resp. Br., pp.1011.) That argument is inappropriate because the exigent circumstances exception, where the
purported exigency is the removal or destruction of evidence, is based on the facts known to the
officers at the time, not on hypotheticals of what might happen. As the Idaho Supreme Court has
held, "In determining whether the officers reasonably feared imminent destruction of evidence,
the appropriate inquiry is whether the facts, as they appeared at the precise moment in question,
would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that evidence might be destroyed before
a warrant could be secured." State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504 (1999). Under the facts as they
appeared at the time of the entry here, there was no evidence of a fire going in the stove. (See
R., pp.273-79.)
Similarly, the State speculates that, "[f]or all the officers knew, [Ms.] Duke was on her
way to start the wood-burning stove or take some other action that would result in the destruction
of evidence." (See Resp. Br., p.11.) Again, there was no evidence that Ms. Duke was going to
start the stove, or do anything else in the house beyond sit in the main room. (See R., pp.27681.) And even if the officers could enter the house to keep an eye on Ms. Duke, the officers'
actions here went far beyond the actions of the officers in McArthur. As the State acknowledges
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(see Resp. Br., p.11 ), the officers in McArthur "neither searched the trailer nor arrested

McArthur before obtaining a warrant," and instead "they imposed a significantly less restrictive
restraint, preventing McArthur only from entering the trailer unaccompanied." McArthur, 531
U.S. at 332. The officer in McArthur who accompanied the defendant "stood just inside the door
to observe what" the defendant did. Id. at 329. Conversely, the officers here followed Ms. Duke
inside the house, and while one officer remained with her in the main room, the two other
officers searched the rest of the house with guns drawn. (See R., pp.280-81.) Thus, the intrusion
here went far beyond the intrusion allowed in McArthur.
A proper understanding of McArthur also negates the State's argument that the officers'
possible less-intrusive option of removing Ms. Duke from the house "does not transform the
officers' reasonable solution to the exigency into a Fourth Amendment violation." (See Resp.
Br., pp.12-13.)

The officers in McArthur "made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law

enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy." See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332.
McArthur requires that officers must tailor the intrusion at issue to the exigent circumstances

presented, by limiting the intrusion in time and scope and avoiding significant intrusion into the
home itself.

See id. at 331.

The officers here did not tailor their intrusion to the exigent

circumstances, if their entry was appropriate at all.
As such, the exigent circumstances exception does not justify the warrantless intrusion
into Ms. Smith's house.
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B.

The Protective Sweep Exception Did Not Justify The Officers' Warrantless Search
Through Ms. Smith's House Because The Officers Did Not Have Reasonable,
Articulable Suspicion That The House Harbored An Individual Posing A Danger
At the time the officers detained Ms. Smith, the facts known to the officers did not create

a reasonable, articulable suspicion that someone else was in the house who posed a threat to the
officers. Thus, the officers' intrusion into the house was not justified as a protective sweep. See

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776 (1999).
The State's argument that it was dark and that there were guns in the house (see Resp.
Br., p.13), does not change that analysis, because the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard
for a protective sweep requires "articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area
to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Buie, 494 U.S. at
334. A mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion is not enough to satisfy this requirement. See

id. at 332-34. The facts known to the officers here did not rise to the level of reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the house was harboring an individual posing a danger to those on
scene at the time the officers detained Ms. Smith.

For instance, Mr. Lopez did not suggest

anyone besides himself had been at the house to help Ms. Smith.

(See R., pp.269-73.)

Moreover, officers had been surveilling the house before Sergeant Phillips and the other officers
went to contact Ms. Smith, and they did not see anyone else arrive at the house. (See R., p.273.)
As such, the totality of the circumstances shows the officers did not have the requisite
reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to justify the warrantless search of Ms. Smith's whole
house as a protective sweep.
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C.

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not Apply To Prevent The Suppression Of The
Evidence Gained From The Unlawful Search Of Ms. Smith's House Because The Search
Warrant Was Based In Part On Information Obtained During The Unlawful Search
The application for the warrant, upon which the State's inevitable discovery doctrine

argument is based, was not obtained through inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the
illegal actions. See State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017). Instead, it was obtained in series
flowing directly from the officers' unlawful search, as evidenced by the fact that the warrant
application contains allegations of fact based on what the officers found while searching
Ms. Smith's house. (See Motion to Suppress Hearing State's Ex. 10, pp.3-4.) As such, the
inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to the unlawful search of Ms. Smith's house.
The State argues, based on State v. Davis, 159 Idaho 491, 494 (Ct. App. 2015), that this
Court should look to see if the other information in the warrant application would have still
supported probable cause for the warrant. (See Resp. Br., p.18.) However, that is not part of the
inevitable discovery test; rather, it is part of the independent source analysis. The inevitable
discovery doctrine "asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions law
enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led to the
evidence." Downing, 163 Idaho at 31 (emphasis in original). "The doctrine must presuppose
inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly
from the officers' unlawful conduct." Id. at 32. The independent source doctrine, while related
to inevitable discovery, applies when "a lawful approach actually taken leads to the discovery of
evidence that was also derived from unlawful means." Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently made it clear that the independent source,
inevitable discovery, and attenuation doctrines are distinct concepts and require separate
analyses. In a case involving whether the State's attenuation argument before the district court
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preserved the State's independent source argument on appeal, the Court held:

"[A]lthough

independent source and attenuation are similar doctrines, it cannot be said that raising one
necessarily implicates the other. While these exceptions, as well as the inevitable discovery
exception, all concern the causal relationship between an unconstitutional act and law
enforcement's later discovery of evidence, their relationship is not so indistinguishable that it
creates an 'all for one, one for all' method of argument." State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, _ , 445
P.3d 147, 152 (2019). Per the Wolfe Court: "Should this be the case, there would be no need for
three distinct exceptions. The fact that each exception is analyzed under a different test supports
this conclusion." Id., 445 P.3d at 152.
Davis is a case about the independent source doctrine. The Idaho Court of Appeals in
Davis held, "[t]he district court correctly determined that the information obtained during the

interview came from a wholly independent source." Davis, 159 Idaho at 494. The Davis Court
also held, "Because the information derived from the interview with the minors is independent
information, the independent source doctrine applies."

Id. at 495. Thus, the Davis Court's

statement that "[a]pplication of the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines to a
search warrant" requires disregarding the improperly obtained information and determining
whether sufficient untainted information remains to provide probable cause is, at best, dicta. See
id. at 494. Or, it has been abrogated by Wolfe on that point. See 165 Idaho at_, 445 P.3d

at 152.
The cases cited in Davis are also independent source cases. In State v. Russo, 157 Idaho
299 (2014 ), the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court erred when it determined an initial
search warrant permitting a search for a cell phone would have led to the inevitable discovery of
a video on the phone, but there was still sufficient information to provide probable cause for
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issuance of an amended search warrant under the independent source doctrine. Id. at 305-07.
Similarly, in State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court held,
“sufficient probable cause existed to supported the issuance of the search warrant and that the
search warrant was issued independent of the evidence initially discovered during the second,
illegal search of Revenaugh’s home.” Id. at 775. Therefore, neither of those cases support the
State’s independent source argument in this case.
Moreover, the State cannot raise an independent source argument for the first time on
appeal, and the inevitable discovery analysis done before the district court is not enough to
preserve that issue. Wolfe indicates that raising an inevitable discovery argument does not
necessarily implicate the independent source doctrine. See 165 Idaho at ___, 445 P.3d at 152.
The Wolfe Court also held that “simply stating the name of a case and a general proposition
therefrom is not enough to raise every specific theory or principle of law within it.” 165 Idaho at
___, 445 P.3d at 151. Thus, the inevitable discovery analysis done before the district court
would not preserve for appeal an independent source argument to justify the unlawful search of
Ms. Smith’s house. (See R., pp.218-21, 295-98.)
The inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to prevent the suppression of the
evidence gained from the unlawful search of Ms. Smith’s house because the search warrant was
based, in part, on information obtained during the unlawful search. This Court should reject the
State’s attempt to switch that issue into an independent source analysis. The district court’s
decision to deny Ms. Smith’s motion to suppress should be reversed because the evidence was
discovered pursuant to an unlawful, warrantless search of her house.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The Leslies' Hearsay Testimony To Be
Admitted For The Truth Of The Matters Asserted
The State's response on the hearsay issue should be rejected because it is made up of
strawman arguments which do not address the actual issue on appeal. Ms. Smith is challenging
the district court's decision to overrule her objection and admit the Leslies' testimony about
what Ms. Duke told them for the truth of the matters asserted, as demonstrated by the fact that,
even if the prosecutor had initially intended that evidence to only be used to impeach Ms. Duke,
he ultimately argued those statements for their truth. 1 (See Tr., p.1724, Ls.11-18). As such,
whether or not the prosecutor initially intended to admit that evidence only to impeach Ms. Duke

(See Resp. Br., p.21 (arguing this should be

is irrelevant to the issue currently on appeal.

considered a non-issue because the prosecutor's intent was proper).)
The State's assertion - that there was no error in the district court not giving a limiting
instruction to the jury sua sponte (Resp. Br., pp.21-22) - is also a strawman, and one that has
already been rejected by the Court of Appeals. See State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22 (Ct. App.
2009). In Gerardo, the State sought to admit the co-defendant's prior statement to police about
what the defendant had allegedly done with the guns. Id. at 26. On appeal, the State argued that
statement was properly admitted only to explain the officers' subsequent actions. Gerardo, 147
1

To this point, Ms. Smith should not be required ( as the State appears to assert (Resp. Br., p.22
n.1)) to challenge the prosecutor's closing argument as misconduct for the axiomatic reason that
it is usually not misconduct for a prosecutor to make an argument that is consistent with the
district court's ruling on a particular issue. The error in this case is not that the prosecutor's
closing argument attempted to recast the nature of the district court's ruling on Ms. Smith's
hearsay objection as the State contends. (Resp. Br., p.22 n.1.) Rather, his closing argument
demonstrates the erroneously-broad scope the district court's ruling had at the outset. Cf State v.
Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27 (Ct. App. 2009) (using the prosecutor's closing argument to evaluate
the scope and impact of the error, not to define whether the initial decision was, itself,
erroneous). Thus, this Court should reject the State's strawman argument in that regard as well.
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Idaho at 26. The Court of Appeals disagreed: "Because the district court did not admit the
evidence for a limited purpose, Gonzalez's statement was erroneously admitted at trial against
Gerardo for the truth of its content." Id. Moreover, it explained there was not an issue in regard
to whether the defendant should have requested a limiting instruction: "[B]ecause the district
court did not indicate that it was admitting Gonzalez's statement against Gerardo for this limited
purpose, which would have notified Gerardo of the possibility of a limiting instruction, we cannot
sustain the admission of the statement on the ground now urged by the State." Id. at 26
(emphasis added). Thus, Gerardo explained, a limiting instruction is given to remind the jurors
of a limitation that was put in place when the evidence was admitted; if the evidence was not
admitted for a limited purpose in the first place, there is no basis on which to request a limiting
instruction. See id.; accord id. at 25 (reaching the same conclusion regarding another statement,
explaining, "the district court never indicated that it was admitting Gonzalez's statement against
Gerardo for this limited purpose,[2] and if it had, Gerardo would have been alerted to the
opportunity to request a limiting instruction, restricting the jury's use of this evidence to this
limited purpose").
As in Gerardo, the district court in this case did not identify any limitations on its
decision to admit the Leslies' hearsay statements, and so, there was no possibility Ms. Smith
could have asked for a limiting instruction - there was no limited purpose about which to instruct
the jurors. Thus, as in Gerardo, the district court simply erred by admitting the hearsay evidence
for the truth of the matter asserted. As such, the only remaining question is whether the error in

2

The State argued the fact that the co-defendant had given officers a particular address was only
admitted as circumstantial evidence of a link between the two defendants, since both had given
the same address, and not for its truth (that they actually lived at that address). Gerardo, 147
Idaho at 25.
12

admitting that hearsay evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gerardo, 147
Idaho at 27.
The State has failed to carry its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this
erroneously-admitted hearsay evidence did not contribute to the verdict actually rendered in this
case. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 206, 221 (2010) (adopting the harmless-error test set forth in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for all objected-to errors). To show an error
harmless under Chapman, the State has to show the erroneously-introduced evidence was not
important within the fabric of the entire case. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1991),
disapproved of on other grounds as stated in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991).
The State initially attempts to meet this burden by arguing that the Leslies’ evidence was not
important because it was duplicative of other evidence presented. (Resp. Br., pp.22-23.) That
argument is flawed for several reasons.
First, the Leslies’ testimony was not actually “duplicative” of any other evidence. No
other witnesses testified about what Betty Duke had previously said; only the Leslies did that.
(See generally Tr.) Moreover, Ms. Duke’s comments, being relayed by the Leslies, contained
specific facts that were not referenced by the other witnesses, such as her explanation for her
initial testimony about the rustling plastic being caused by the dog, not Ms. Smith.

(See

Tr., p.1254, L.20 - p.1255, L.5; cf. Tr., p.1296, Ls.4-15 (Ms. Leslie testifying Ms. Duke had told
her Ms. Smith had wrapped the body in plastic).) As such, the Leslies’ testimony was not
duplicative of any other testimony (except, perhaps, of each other’s).
Moreover, the contents of the Leslies’ testimony was important within the fabric of this
case because it was the only evidence presented to counter Ms. Duke’s testimony. The critical
question in this case was who had shot Mr. Davis in Ms. Smith’s home. Ms. Duke was the only
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other person in the house at the time of the shooting, and she testified she heard Mr. Day’s car
return, and that he had shot Mr. Davis. (Tr., p.1250, L.5 – p.1251, L.4.) Moreover, Ms. Smith
admitted she had tried to deal with the body herself, explaining she was afraid if she told the
police, Mr. Day would kill her too. (See Tr., p.1620, L.2 - p.1621, L.21.) As such, the forensic
evidence in this case was of less overall importance within the context of this particular case. As
such, it was critical for the prosecutor to counter Ms. Duke’s first-hand witness testimony. Since
the Leslies’ testimony was the only counter to Ms. Duke’s testimony, the Leslies’ testimony was
clearly important within the context of all the evidence presented in this case. Therefore, the
State has failed to prove the erroneous admission of the Leslies’ hearsay evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
That importance of the Leslies’ testimony was actually heightened by the fact that the
jurors got to consider their testimony for the truth of the matters asserted – for example, that
Ms. Smith had, as a matter of fact, admitted to Ms. Duke in the moments after the shooting that
she had shot Mr. Davis, and that Ms. Smith had, as a matter of fact, rolled the body in plastic that
night. (See Tr., p.1296, Ls.4-15, p.1297, Ls.3-10.) When considered for the truth, that testimony
went to the heart of the contested issue. That is why the prosecutor actually urged the jurors to
consider it in precisely that manner. (Tr., p.1724, Ls.11-18.) Thus, the Leslies’ testimony,
particularly when considered for its truth, was absolutely important within the context of the
entire case, which means it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second reason the State’s “duplicative” argument fails is that it misunderstands the
standard for assessing whether an error was harmless. The harmless error analysis is not a zerosum analysis – just because there is other evidence presented in the case, that does not mean the
erroneously-admitted evidence was not still also important. See Yates, 500 U.S. at 403 (“To say
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that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.”)
(emphasis added). In fact, the research reveals that duplicative evidence is actually more likely
to be “important” in a jury’s deliberations as jurors, contrary to judges and attorneys, place more
weight on cumulative evidence because it reinforces a particular point. See Anne Bowen Poulin,
Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for Blurred Lines, 17 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 991, 1059
(2015) (“Because of their experience and training, judges may dismiss evidence as cumulative,
concluding it had or would have had limited impact, whereas jurors actually attach significant
weight to redundant evidence.”) (citing Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How
Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. Rev. 1053,
1091-92 (2005), and Reid Hastie, et al., Inside the Jury, 163-64 (1983)); cf. Gerardo, 147 Idaho
at 27 (noting that, since another witness also testified as to the defendant’s address, that
cumulative evidence made it less likely the erroneous admission of the tangential hearsay
evidence contributed to the verdict in that case). As such, even if the State is correct, and the
Leslies’ improperly-admitted hearsay evidence was merely duplicative, that fact actually reveals
the reasonable possibility that this evidence was important and contributed to the jury’s verdict in
this case, particularly given its direct link to the primary question before the jury.
That reasoning also demonstrates why the State’s other argument for harmlessness – that
there was, in the State’s opinion, overwhelming evidence of guilt (Resp. Br., pp.23-24) – is
improper. In fact, that argument runs directly contrary to the applicable Idaho Supreme Court
and United States Supreme Court precedent.
First, though, the case the State cites in support of its argument that the jury still would
have convicted because of the “overwhelming evidence” does not actually support its argument.
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(Resp. Br., pp.24-27 (citing State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40 (2017)).) Montgomery dealt
with a conviction for discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, and whether the error in not
disclosing a rebuttal witness required reversal of that conviction. See generally Montgomery,
163 Idaho 40. The problematic rebuttal witness testified as to exactly how many bullets were
recovered from the car. Id. at 46. However, that was not the critical point - the defendant would
be guilty whether he had fired one shot or several into the car. See id. Moreover, the defendant
had not contested that the critical point of whether he had fired a shot into the vehicle. Id. at 46.
See id. As such, the Montgomery Court's conclusion that the error was harmless because there
was "overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery" was not saying that, regardless of
the error, the verdict surely would have been the same based on that other evidence; rather, it
was saying that the testimony erroneously admitted was not important within the context, given
all the evidence presented on the uncontested, critical point. Id.; cf State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho
862, 868 (2019) (applying the "contributed to" test from Chapman, not an "overwhelming
evidence" analysis such as the State is asking for here, in determining that the fact that a blood
test showed the defendant over the legal limit for alcohol meant the error in commenting on his
refusal to take a breath test did not contribute to the verdict actually rendered).
Montgomery's and Jeske's analysis in this regard is consistent with the way the United
States Supreme Court has always approached the question of harmlessness. 3 In fact, in Chapman
itself, the Supreme Court actually criticized the lower court for engaging in the sort of analysis
the State now endorses here: "the California courts have neutralized this to some extent by

3

To the extent Montgomery might be read to support the State's argument, it would be contrary
to the applicable United States Supreme Court precedent on point, and thus, should be overruled
(if it has not already been abrogated by Jeske). See, e.g., Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119
Idaho 72, 77 (1990) (explaining that precedent should be overruled when, inter alia, it is
manifestly wrong or doing so is "necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law").
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emphasis, and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court's view of 'overwhelming evidence."'

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 & n.7 (specifically noting the lower court in that case had found the
error to be harmless "because it found from 'other substantial evidence, (that) the proof of his
guilt must be deemed overwhelming"'). "We prefer," the Chapman Court continued, a different
approach, one which evaluates "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has been clear that its preferred analysis does not
assess what the jury would have done without that evidence, but rather, whether the erroneous
evidence was important within the context of all the evidence presented. See, e.g., Yates, 500
U.S. at 403. "The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart
from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial
influence." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (emphasis added); accord

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 ("[T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may ... be deemed harmless.").
The State's argument, like the rejected analysis from the California court in Chapman,
improperly switches the focus of the analysis, taking it off the question of "what impact the
erroneously-introduced evidence had" and putting it on the question of "what impact would the
appellate court believe the State's other evidence had." Flipping the analysis in this way, both
the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have made clear, would actually
result in an independent violation of Ms. Smith's constitutional rights: "it violates the jury-trial
guarantee for a court to 'hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter
how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be."' State v. Shackleford, 150 Idaho
355, 387 (2010) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993)) (punctuation
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altered) (emphasis added). 4 That is exactly what the State asks this Court to do by concluding
the jury would still have convicted Ms. Smith based on the other "overwhelming" evidence
regardless of the Leslies' erroneous testimony. (See Resp. Br., pp.24-27.) Therefore, the State's
argument on harmlessness should be rejected because it would create an independent
constitutional violation.
Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have made
clear, this Court should consider '"what effect it [the error] had upon the guilty verdict in the
case at hand."' State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, _ , 342 P.3d 628, 631 (2015) (quoting
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279); accord Yates, 500 U.S. at 403; Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868. The Leslies'

testimony about what Ms. Duke told them, particularly when (as discussed supra) it is
considered for the truth of the matter asserted, had an important effect on the verdict in this case
because it went directly to the pivotal question on which that verdict was based - whether
Mr. Day or Ms. Smith shot Mr. Davis.

Compare State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11-12 (2013)

(explaining that, while there was other evidence on which the jurors could have based their
verdict, the error went to the primary point of contention, and so, was not harmless because it
was important within the context of all the other evidence presented), with Montgomery, 163
Idaho at 46 (holding that, where the erroneously-admitted evidence went to a tangential point,
rather than the central question, the error was harmless because it was not important within the

4

Despite the Idaho Supreme Court's reliance on Sullivan, the Court of Appeals has recently held
that, because Sullivan ultimately determined the error in that case was structural, such that the
Chapman standard was not applicable in that case, Sullivan's discussion of what Chapman
standard requires is not applicable to harmless error review in Idaho. State v. Joslin,_ P.3d
_ , 2019 WL 4941722, *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019), not yet final; but see, e.g., State v. Joy,
155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013) ("Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.' Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 ... (1993).") (emphasis from original).
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context of all the other evidence presented). Therefore, the State has failed to carry its burden to
prove the erroneous admission of the Les lies' hearsay testimony for its truth harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt on this record. As such, this Court should vacate the judgment and remand the
case for a new trial without that improper evidence.

III.
Several Of Ms. Smith's Rights Were Violated, Amounting To Fundamental Error, When A
Video Showing Her Repeatedly Refusing To Consent To A Search Of Her House Was Admitted
At Trial And The Prosecutor Argued The Jurors Should Infer Her Guilt Based On Those
Refusals
A.

When The Error In This Case Is Properly Understood, The State's Arguments On The
First Prong Of The Perry Analysis Are Revealed To Be Internally Inconsistent And
Untenable
The State's arguments on the first prong of the Perry test are internally inconsistent. For

example, it asserts that the video of Ms. Smith's statements on the porch was not being used to
imply her guilt or to impeach her credibility, but then, it argues that the prosecutor used her
conduct on the porch to show that Ms. Smith was lying to the officers.

( Compare Resp.

Br., p.29, with Resp. Br., p.38.) Using her conduct on the porch, which includes her invocation
of her rights, to show that she was lying (or, as the prosecutor put it below, that "she had
something to hide") is the very definition of using her invocation of her rights to attack her
credibility.

Therefore, the State has effectively admitted the constitutional violation in the

presentation of Exhibit 4 to the jurors. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470 (2007)
(holding that the State cannot use a person's exercise of her Fourth Amendment rights either to
imply guilt or to impeach the defendant).
The State appears to have tried to avoid that inconsistency by completely separating its
analysis on the admission of Exhibit 4 from its analysis on the prosecutor's closing statements
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regarding Exhibit 4. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., pp.27-38.) That is improper, as those are both aspects
of the same overarching issue – the use of evidence of her invocation of her rights to imply her
guilt. (See generally App. Br., pp.22-29.) The fact that, during his closing arguments, the
prosecutor doubled down on the error in admitting that exhibit in the first place by actually
giving voice to the impermissible inferences which could be drawn from Exhibit 4 itself, does
not constitute some sort of separate error to be analyzed in total isolation from the presentation of
that exhibit.

Cf. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 & 67 (2011) (finding error in the

presentation of certain testimony because “the jury was likely to infer the reason [the officer]
only ‘attempted’ to interview Mr. Ellington rather than actually interviewing him was because he
chose to invoke his right to remain silent once he was put under arrest,” and explaining that
would also have been held to be misconduct, if that aspect of that issue had been raised
on appeal).
Once this issue is properly understood, the State’s arguments do not withstand analysis.
In addition to the internal inconsistency noted above, the State’s assertion – that, because the
prosecutor did not expressly reference Ms. Smith’s statements on the video, his closing
arguments were not drawing an improper inference from her exercise of her rights (Resp.
Br., p.38) – is disingenuous. The only possible piece of evidence from which the prosecutor
could base his assertion that Ms. Smith felt the officers “needed to leave . . . That’s what she
wanted them to do” was her statements telling them they could not enter her house without a
warrant (i.e., exercising her rights). (See Tr., p.1722, Ls.6-10.) As such, considering the full
issue reveals that the prosecutor was giving voice to the improper inference the jurors were
already likely to draw from Exhibit 4.
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A proper understanding of the actual issue also reveals the State’s reliance on State v.
Folk, 162 Idaho 620 (2017), is misplaced. (See Resp. Br., pp.35-36.) Folk dealt with a case
which had been remanded for a new trial. See generally 162 Idaho 620. During the new trial,
evidence that the defendant had given testimony at the prior trial was introduced. Id. at 634.
However, there is no indication that any reference was made to the defendant’s decision of
whether to testify in the new trial. See generally id. Nevertheless, during his closing arguments,
the defendant (representing himself pro se) brought that issue up on his own initiative, telling the
jury, “You may have noticed that I did not testify this time.” Folk, 162 Idaho at 634. He
explained, “Taking the stand allows the prosecutor to make the most innocent person look
guilty.” Id. at 635. Once the defendant made that argument on his own initiative, the Supreme
Court held the prosecutor was able to respond to that assertion and argue the reason the
defendant did not testify was that, unlike the alleged victim, he did not want his version of events
subject to cross-examination. Id. at 634-35. More importantly, any error in that regard was
immediately remedied by a curative instruction given by the judge sua sponte. Id. at 635-36.
Unlike the defendant in Folk, Ms. Smith did not bring up her exercise of her Fourth
Amendment rights on her own initiative. Rather, she only discussed that fact after the State had
introduced Exhibit 4, with its comments on her exercise of her rights, in its case-in-chief, and she
addressed that issue specifically to address the improper inferences the jurors were already likely
drawing from her statements on the video. (See Tr., p.524, Ls.3-16 (publishing Exhibit 4 to the
jury); Tr., p.1625, Ls.7-16 (Ms. Smith’s response specifically to what Exhibit 4 showed: “And
we’ve seen a video of the police showing up on your doorstep? . . .”).) As such, unlike in Folk,
the State did not have clean hands in terms of bringing up the constitutional issue. In this case,
the State brought that issue to the jurors’ attention first. And even if some of the blame for
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bringing up that issue could be cast on Ms. Smith, there was, unlike in Folk, no curative
instruction given immediately to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's improper arguments. 5
As such, the admission of that exhibit and the prosecutor's request for the jurors to draw the
improper inference from it still constitutes a violation of Ms. Smith's constitutional rights under
the first prong of the Perry analysis.
Finally, the State asserts there was no constitutional violation in this regard because
Exhibit 4 contained some admissible statements interspersed between Ms. Smith's exercises of
her constitutional rights. (Resp. Br., p.29.) That argument is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme
Court precedent because it is tantamount to a res gestae argument - that this otherwise-improper
evidence should be admitted because it was nearly contemporaneous to other, admissible
evidence. See State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 573-74 (2017). Kralovec made it clear that
Idaho does not use res gestae rationales to justify the admission of evidence anymore; rather, the
specific part of the evidence in question must be admissible in its own right. Id. Comments on
the defendant's invocation of her Fourth Amendment rights to imply her guilt or to impeach her
credibility are not admissible in their own right. Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 4 70. Therefore, the
portions of the video showing Ms. Smith's invocation of her rights remained inadmissible even if
there were other parts of the video which could be admitted. 6

5

As discussed in regard to the hearsay issue, the fact that Ms. Smith's attorney did not request
any such curative instructions means the fact that no limiting instruction was given is not an
independent basis for vacating her conviction.
6
If the prosecutor felt the need to present Ms. Smith's other statements to the jury, it could have
redacted the portions of the video in which Ms. Smith exercised her rights from the trial exhibit.
Cf Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61 (noting there was no relevant reason to even ask the officer the
question which could touch on the defendant's exercise of his rights in the midst of eliciting
other admissible testimony). If a redacted video were shown to the jury, an exhibit with the full
video could have been included in the district court's record but not shown to the jury, if the
district court felt it would be beneficial to have the full video for context in a subsequent
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For all those reasons, the admission and use of Exhibit 4, with its improper comments on
Ms. Smith's exercise of her Fourth Amendment rights, violated Ms. Smith's unwaived
constitutional rights.

B.

The Record In This Case Clearly Shows The Failure To Object To Exhibit 4 Was
Not Strategic
The State contends that Ms. Smith's argument fails under the second prong of Perry

because defense counsel's foundation objection does not show a strategy to keep Exhibit 4 out of
the trial entirely.

(Resp. Br., pp.29-30.) That argument fails to appreciate the fundamental

nature of foundation objections. Evidence is not admissible until the proponent lays sufficient
foundation.

Therefore, if a party objects on the basis of foundation and that objection is

sustained, the evidence remains entirely inadmissible, unless and until the proponent lays the
necessary foundation. See State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 82 (2007) (indicating that, when the
defense failed to establish proper foundation for an expert opinion in its offer of proof, that
opinion was properly excluded entirely from the trial). That means, if the proponent fails to
subsequently lay the necessary foundation, the evidence remains inadmissible. See id. Thus, an
objection on foundation is an effort to keep an exhibit out entirely.
That was, in fact, the thrust of defense counsel's objection to Exhibit 4: "since they're
not calling Guy Lopez first, there may not be sufficient foundation for the playing of the
tape . ... "

(Tr., p.492, Ls.21-25 (emphasis added).)

Defense counsel's argument was that,

unless and until the State elicited admissible testimony from Mr. Lopez to lay the foundation to
explain why the officers did what they did, the video of their investigation should remain

review. (See Tr., p.494, Ls.14-20.) However, giving the entire video to the jury, just to give
them context, is improper. See Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74.
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unplayed during the trial. (See Tr., p.492, Ls.21-25, p.495, Ls.5-8.) Therefore, the record
reveals trial counsel’s strategy was to keep the video out entirely, if possible.
The State’s attempt to avoid that conclusion by pointing out that defense counsel
identified the witness to whom he thought the prosecutor might turn in order to lay the lacking
foundation is unpersuasive. (See Resp. Br., p.30.) Anticipating an argument is not the same
thing as conceding an argument.

If that objection were sustained and the prosecutor

subsequently failed to, or chose not to, elicit the necessary testimony from Mr. Lopez, the video
would have remained inadmissible. However, the prosecutor argued, and the judge ultimately
decided, that Mr. Lopez’s testimony was not actually needed to lay foundation for the video, and
so, the video should be admitted without any additional testimony. (Tr., p.494, Ls.5-13, p.495,
Ls.14-18.) None of that changes the fact that defense counsel’s strategy in making that objection
while anticipating Mr. Lopez as the potential source of the missing evidence was to try to
prevent the video from coming in during the trial.
The same is true of the State’s argument that this was a “conditional” objection. (See
Resp. Br., pp.29-30.)

In fact, the State’s argument in that regard takes defense counsel’s

statement out of context. The context reveals that the foundation objection in this case was not
“conditional” based on whether the State called Mr. Lopez, unless all foundation objections are
considered “conditional” on whether the proponent was able to subsequently lay proper
foundation. Rather, the context reveals Ms. Smith’s foundation objection was conditional on
whether the district court reconsidered its decision in limine that the entry into the home was
lawful: “And so my conditional . . . but since they’re not calling Guy Lopez first, there may not
be sufficient foundation for the playing of the tape, unless the Court reserves ruling on the
admissibility of the entry into the home until after Guy Lopez testifies.” (Tr., p.492, Ls.21-25
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(emphasis added).) If all the evidence at the house was inadmissible because the entrance into
the house was unlawful, then the video would also be inadmissible because it would not be
relevant to the facts admissible at trial. Thus, the context of defense counsel’s “conditional”
objection only further reveals that his actual strategy was to keep all that evidence, including the
video, out of the trial.
Finally, the State’s assertion that there may have been a potential strategy option which
would benefit from letting the video in – that some aspects of the video which showed the
officers exaggerating the information they had received, such that there may have been potential
strategic value to allowing the video to come in (see Tr., p.492, Ls.11-16) – is also unpersuasive.
As the Idaho Supreme Court recently clarified, the analysis on this prong of the analysis focuses
on what the record actually shows, not on whatever potential strategy decisions appellate counsel
can identify in hindsight. See State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, ___, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019).
The record in this case clearly shows that, even though defense counsel might have
realized he could potentially be able to impeach the officers’ credibility with their statements on
Exhibit 4, the strategy he actually decided to employ was to try to keep the video out:
I think on the video there may be some statements from Guy Lopez that
the police are telling Melonie that “We have information out here that someone
needs medical assistance.”
I don’t think that’s what Guy Lopez said, and so I think the police officers
are exaggerating.
And so my conditional -- but I don’t tell the State in what order to call
their witnesses. I’m just saying I may have a foundational objection to be
reserved until -- and I don’t know exactly how to do this, but the -- but since
they’re not calling Guy Lopez first, there may not be sufficient foundation for the
playing of the tape, unless the Court reserve ruling on the admissibility of the
entry into the home until after Guy Lopez testifies.
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(Tr., p.492, Ls.11-25.) Ultimately, the fact that trial counsel had a backup strategy ready to go in
the event he was unsuccessful in his primary strategy to keep the video out demonstrates that his
failure to object on other, viable grounds in support of his primary strategy was not a tactical
decision. Cf State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2013). Therefore, the State's argument in that
regard is actually the same sort of speculative argument that the Miller Court refused to consider.
Rather, as in Easley, Ms. Smith has satisfied the second prong of the fundamental error
test because the record actually shows his failure to object was not strategic since the strategy he
actually employed was to keep the video out if possible.

C.

The Error Is Prejudicial Under The Third Prong Of Perry, As Clarified By Miller
The State's first argument on the third prong of the Perry analysis relies on a false

correlation - that, because Exhibit 7 contained the same improper comments on Ms. Smith's
exercise of her rights, Exhibit 4 could not have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
(Resp. Br., p.30.) However, as Miller clarified, the focus of the third prong of this analysis is on
the effect the erroneously-admitted evidence had on this trial, on "[w] hether the error affected
the trial proceedings," not on whether other evidence might have also had an impact. Miller, 165
Idaho at_, 443 P.3d at 133-34 (explaining the analysis is on whether, "i.e., the error identified
in the first and second prongs actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings") (emphasis
added, punctuation altered).
The reason that is the focus of the analysis is that the third prong uses the test set forth in
Chapman v. California, with the appellant bearing the burden of proof Perry, 150 Idaho at 22526 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. 18).

As discussed in Section II, supra, the question under

Chapman is whether the erroneously-admitted evidence contributed to the verdict, on whether
the erroneously-admitted evidence was important within the fabric of all the evidence presented.
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See, e.g., Yates, 500 U.S. at 403-04; Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868. Thus, whether Exhibit 7 was also
erroneously proffered and contributed to the outcome does not affect the analysis of whether
Exhibit 4 contributed to the outcome. 7
The record is clear that Exhibit 4 was actually important to the jury's deliberations, and
thus, it actually affected the outcome. The central issue for the jurors in this case was whether
they believed Ms. Smith's testimony that Mr. Day shot Mr. Davis, or whether they believed that
she had done it herself Exhibit 4' s improper depiction of her exercising her rights, admitted to
show "she had something to hide," went directly to that question, either to imply her guilt
directly from her actions, or at least, to discredit her version of events based on those actions.
The prosecutor specifically asked the jurors to consider her actions in this improper manner.
(Tr., p.1722, Ls.6-11.) Thus, Exhibit 4 presented evidence that was important within the fabric
of this whole case.
More importantly though, the jurors specifically asked to review only Exhibit 4 during
their deliberations.

(R., p.465.)

As such, there is clear evidence that the jurors actually

considered the erroneously-admitted Exhibit 4 to be important in their deliberations, and it,
therefore, obviously affected those proceedings. Cf Thomas, 157 Idaho at_, 342 P.3d at 631
(pointing out the importance of a jury's question about particular evidence in assessing the

Chapman standard in regard to an objected-to error). As a result, this record is clear that the
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings, contributing to the verdict this jury actually
rendered in an important way.

Therefore, Ms. Smith has shown that the error in admitting

7

In fact, since the jury did not ask to review Exhibit 7, it is not at all clear that a separate claim
could be made that the admission of Exhibit 7 was fundamental error under the standard
articulated in Perry and Miller. In other words, unlike Exhibit 4, the likely-erroneous admission
of Exhibit 7 was simply unobjected-to error which cannot be remedied under Miller.
27

Exhibit 4 was prejudicial under the third prong of Perry, and thus, that error is fundamental
error.
IV.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Ms. Smith's Fourteenth Amendment Right
To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived Her Of
Her Right To A Fair Trial
The State's response on the cumulative error analysis fails for the same reason its
harmlessness arguments failed in Section II - it argues under the wrong standard. The Idaho
Supreme Court has made it clear that the test for cumulative error is based on the Chapman
harmless error test.

See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007) (determining the

accumulated errors in that case were not harmless because their combined effect affected the trial
proceedings even though each was individually unimportant within the context of that case);

accord State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694, 725 (2009) (W. Jones, J., dissenting) (articulating and
applying the standard for cumulative error (the majority only found one error, so concluded the
cumulative error doctrine did not apply)). Thus, the question is whether the cumulative effect of
all those errors contributed to the verdict this jury actually rendered. See, e.g., Yates, 500 U.S. at
403-04; Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868.
For all the reasons discussed in Section II, supra, the State's request that this Court focus
on the impact of the other, allegedly-overwhelming evidence regardless of all the erroneouslyadmitted evidence is improper under the applicable standard. The cumulative effect of these
errors, like the errors in Field, affected the trial proceedings, particularly since they were all
directed at the central point at issue. As such, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove the
cumulative errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and so, this Court should vacate the
tainted convictions in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction, reverse
the district court's order denying her motion to suppress, and remand her case for further
proceedings. Alternatively, Ms. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment
of conviction and remand her case for a new trial.
DATED this 11 th day of October, 2019.
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